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Summary findings
Conservation  budgets are limited, so it is right to ask of  "visceral"  characteristics,  influence  government  decisions
biodiversity  programs, What should be preserved?  How  on whether to protect a species  under the Endangered
much should be preserved?  Where?  Species  Act.
Recent  papers on optimal preservation  policy  have  Metrick and Weitzman  find that "visecral"
tried to integrate three considerations:  the relative  characteristics  - especially  physical  size and taxonomic
uniqueness  of different species  er habitats, the degree of  class  - are also important in explaining how much is
risk to their continued survival,  and the opportunity cost  spent on endangered  species.  Perhaps more surprising  is
of the resources  needed to enhance their prospects  for  their finding that more is spent on animals  with lower
survival.  risk of extinction than on animals with higher risk of
It is natural to ask, How are we doing? Have  extinction.
biodiversity  conservation resources  been optimally  Metrick and Weitzman's  results  are sobering.  Many
allocated?  What determines government  decisions  about  millions have  been spent on species  preservation,  but
the preservation  of endangered species?  Metrick and  neither uniqueness  nor risk has weighed heavily  in
Weimnan submit the first report card, an empirical  resource allocation. Instead  there has been a heavy bias
analysis  of U.S.  species  preservation  policy, the best-  toward "charismatic  megafauna"  - large,  well-known
documented  country experience  currently available.  birds and manmals ("higher forms of life," in the human
Metrick and Weitzman discuss  the most common  value system).  Other classes  of fauna-including,  say,
normnive justifications  for biodiversity  preservation and  eels or wild toads - and all flora, have gotten extremely
identify measurable  proxies for a subset of those  short shrift.
justifications.  Proxies include "scientific"  species  Prominent  examples  of species  with high charisma,
characteristics,  such as "degree of endangermente  and  high attention, and relatively  low endangerment are the
"taxonomic  uniqueness," as weil as "visceral"  bald eagle, the Florida scrub jay, and the grizzly  bear.
characteristics,  such as physical  size and to what extenr a  Other species  may have  less charisma  but could have
species  is considered a "higher form of life."  They find  more scientific  value or species  risk.
that both kinds of characteristics,  but especially
This paper - a product of the Environment,  Infrastructure, and Agriculture  Division,  Policy Research  Department  - is
part of a larger effort in the division  to see what lessons  can be learned about environmental  protection from the U.S.
experience.  Copies  of the paper are available  free  from the World Bank,  18  18 H Street  NW, Washington,  DC  20433. Please
contact  Anna Maranon, room N10-033, extension  39074 (28 pages).  September  1994.
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FOREWORD
Intemational institutions have begun responding to the clear threat of a global
extinction spasm in the twenty-first century.  At the World Bank, biodiversity preservation is
now cental  to the mandate for environmentally  sustainable  development. During the coming
decade, billions of dollars for conservation will be channeled through the Global
Environment Facility, development  banks, and international  aid agencies.
While concern for global environmental  issues may well have expanded the total
international development budget, it may also have reduced the allocation for more traditional
projects.  The opportunity cost of any such diversion would be extremely high, since over
one billion people still subsist in conditions of absolute poverty.  It is therefore imperative to
assure that conservation  resources are optimally employed.
What is optimality  in this context?  Until recently, it has fallen to environmentalists,
conservation biologists, and other concerned scientists to define biodiversity and recommend
strategies for its preservation.  Their scientific contribution  has been and will remain
indispensable, for economists  and prcect  managers in institutions like the World Bank cannot
hope to attain more than elementary knowledge of the relevant scientific and taxonomic
principles.  Because conservation  budgets are limited, however, biodiversity policy cannot
avoid some important resource allocation questions: What should be preserved? How much
should be preserved? Where?
In this domain, economists  have sometiing useful to say.  Recent theoretical and
empirical papers on optimal preservation policy have attempted to integre  three
considerations: the relative uniqueness of different species or habitats, the degree of risk to
their continued survival, and the opportunity  cost of the resources needed to enhance survival
prospects.  With these new additions to the economist's toolkit, it is natural to ask: 'How are
we doing? Have biodiversity conservation resources been optimally allocated to date?'
Answers require careful empirical analysis of actual polcy  choices and resource allocation
decisions.  In this innovative paper, Professors Andrew Metrick and Martin Weitzman
submit the first report card.  They have begun with an empirical analysis of U.S.  species
preservation policy, which is the best-documented  country experience cmurently  available for
study.
Their results are sobering.  From a scientfic perspective, U.S. performance to date
does not appear to warrant a passing grade.  Many millions have been spent on species
preservation, but neither uniqueness nor risk has weighed  very heavily in resource allocation.
Instead, there has been a very heavy bias toward 'charismatic megafauna" - relatively large,
well-known birds and mammals.  AR other classes of fauna, and all flora, have gotten
extremely short shrift.ii
In the World Bank, of course, our concerns are not focused on the success or failure
of particular policies in wealthy societies like the U.S.  But the U.S.  has arguably devoted
more scientific, technical and financial resources to the species conservation  problem than
any other nation.  If U.S. performance is distinctly subpar, how are our client countries
doing at this point?  For that matter, what about the major NGO's which also invest many
millions in conservation? Most critically from our perspective, how are the World Bank and
other multilateral agencies doing?  This paper makes an extremely valuable contribution by
providing a model for further empirical analysis.  It will be difficult to improve biodiversity
conservation  policies without clear assessments of their current direction.  Fuure  work by
PRDEI will pursue this issue in the global context.
David Wheelee
*Although  Professors Metrick  and Weitmnan  have kindly aLowed me to write  this introduction,  the views expressed  here are
my own.  They do not  necessarily reflect the views of the authors.I
1. Introduction
As a society,  we seem  to have  made  a generalized  commitment  to conserving
biodiversity. But how do we spend  our limited  resources  on this commitment?  What  should
we be doing,  what do we say we are doing,  and what are we doing? Such  questions  are easy
to pose but difficult  to answer. In this paper, we set a more modest  goal than providing  a
single  comprehensive  answer. Our hope is to tease  out hints  of answers  by studying  actual
decisions  made  by the U.S. govemment  about which  species  to protect  and how much  to
spend  on them.
Narrowly,  this paper is about determining  what explains  the species-by-species
protection  and spending  decisions  of certain  relevant  U.S. federal  and state  government
organizations.'  To perform  this analysis,  we have  combined  several  distinct  datasets  from
different  government  and scientific  sources. We think that the resulting  combination  offers  a
rare opportunity  for empirically-based  insights  into preferences  about  biodiversity
conservation.  Decisions  about endangered  species  reflect  the values, pecptions,  and
contradictions  of the society  that makes  them. Thus, more  broadly,  this paper addresse
some  very general  issues  about man's relation  to nature  and about  human  choice  when
confronted  by competing  and often unquandfiable  objectives.
The Endangered  Species  Act of 1973  gave  the federal  government  the power to
protect  U.S. species  from extinction. Simply  by listing  a species  as endangered,  the
govemment  can cause  many  development  projects  to be delayed  or canceled,  and millions  of
dollars  in opportunity  costs to be incurred. Indeed,  once  a species  is placed  on the
endangered  species  list, cost-benefit  analysis  is practically  precluded. Additionally,  all listed
species  are eligible  to have funds  spent  directly  on their recovery,  with  the eventual  goal of
'Readers  interested  in other  studies of revealed preference of government  decision-making  are referred to
McFadden (1975) and (1976), Weingast  and Moran (1983), Thomas (1988) and Cropper etal.  (1992). The
most closely related  work to our own is Manm  and  Plummer (1993).2
having their endangerment  reduced to levels that would allow  'them to be removed from the
list.  Overall, the relevant government  agencies face difficult problems of, first, deciding
which species to place on the endangered  species list and, second, deciding how much to
spend on the recovery of each listed species.  In the sections that follow, we examine these
two decisions  in detail.  We believe this subject deserves serious  attention from economists
because the direct and indirect costs of this type of environmental  protection  are already
substantial, and such expenditure  is growing more rapidly than almost any other comparably
sized item in the national economy.'
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a discussion  of
various normative  justifications for the preservation of biodiversity  and of the difficulties  of
constructing  a single objective  function that the government  might be expected to follow.
We then identify a subset of these normative  justifications that can be defined operationally
and quantified, and we describe the data that we use for them.  This subset includes
'scientific' characterstics such as "degree of endangerment"  and 'taxonomic uniqueness" as
well as more 'visceral' characteristics  such as "physical size" and the degree to which a
species is perceived  as a "higher form of life".  In Section 3, we describe the Endangered
Species Act and the listing process in more detail, and then estimate a regression to
determine  the relative importance  of these species characteristics  in the listing decision.  We
find that both 'scientfic'  and 'visceral' elements play an important role in determining
whether a species  becomes listed.  In Section 4, we focus on the government's direct
spending to improve the condition of listed species. First, we describe the available spending
data and the method by whiich  it was collected. Then, using the same independent  variables
as in Section 3, we estimate a regression with "species-by-species"  spending  as the dependent
variable.  We find that the 'visceral' characteristics  play a highly significant  role in
explaining  the observed spending  patterns, while the more 'scientific' characteristics  appear
to have little influence.  Next, in Section 5, we extend the analysis to include explanatory
variables of a more openly bureaucratic  nature.  The goal here is to determine  how closely
'm  illustration  of tdis  growth  is the  drmatic  rise  in direct  expendiues  on species-by-species  presevation.
These  figures  are studied in Section  4.3
the government is following  its own system for prioritization of spending.  Results are
mixed; while the formal priority system is followed to some degree, there is evidence that its
least important component  plays a disproportionate  role.  Finally, Section 6 concludes with a
summary of the results and a discussion of some broader themes which we believe are
suggested by the analysis.
2.  Objectives  in Biodiversity  Preservation
A. Overview
In this section we attempt to identify  all relevant variables which might influence
endangered species policy.  Before getting into any details of what the actual policies are, we
model the government as facing a choice of possible species to preserve and ask, "What
characteristics  should matter when deciding where to put our scarce conservation resouxces?"
In an ideal study of this subject, we would have a well-defined  objective function for society
as a whole, and the observed government  behavior could be judged on the basis of how well
it satisfied such a standard.  In the case of biodiversity preservation, however, the most
sting  feature is the almost complete lack of any such arnchor. Even in fields as contentious
as health policy or environmental risk management, there is some 'currency' around which
the analysis can be framed.  In biodiversity preservation, however, no such measure has yet
been agreed upon, and decision-maldng  bodies are left with a shopping list of objectives that
are not easily comparable to each other.  In our opinion, it is essential to recognize this 'lack
of an anchor" as a cental  feature of biodiversity preservation, and we do not propose a
complete solution to such a difficult problem.  Insaead, we study only the elements that are
both relevant and measurable: relevant because they usually show up in the "shopping list of
objectives", and measurable'  because it is possible to identify quantifiable  proxies.  Then, we
attempt to determine which of these elements is  -actually  important for explaining the pattems
of behavior in the data4
Throughout our discussion, we use the conservation  of species as the main vehicle for
biodiversity  preservation? In this species-oriented  approach,  we find it useful  to divide
arguments  for the preservation  of biodiversity  into four broad  classes. First, species  may
have  commercial  value  in uses such  as food, medicine,  clothing  or tourism. This may
sometimes  be referred to as 'use" or "utilitarian"  value. Second,  existence  value  represents
the pleasure  people  derive  from simply  knowing  that a species  exists  in the wild, even  if
representatives  are never actually  observed  directly. This is a component  of aesthetic  value
that, by definition,  cannot  be captured  in tourism  or other  commercial  measures;  for this
reason, it is sometimes  referred  to as "non-use"  value. Third, it is sometimes  argued that if
we allow biodiversity  to deteriorate  below (currently  unknown)  critical  levels, then
ecosystems  may collapse,  thus  causing  significant  repercussions  in other spheres. We refer
to this as ecosystem value.  If we believe that this value is important, then we should act to
preserve  species  that may be important  "keystones"  for their respective  ecosystems. Fourth,
there is a moral  argument,  originating  ultimately  from religious  and philosophical
convictions,  that we have  an ethical  obligation  to preserve  species,  notwithstanding  any direct
benefits  to humans.
Witin each of these four types  of arguments,  there may be several  components  that
provide  motivation  for current  government  policy;  in the next subsection  we attempt  to
isolate  those which seem  to be both relevant  and measurable. These "relevant  and
measurable"  components  fall exclusively  within  the category  we have  labeled  existence  value.
This is not to say that the other three categories  are not valid motivations;  rather, it is that
there are no measurable  components  of these other categories  that can be used to understand
current  policy. The reasons  are different  in each case. First, although  there are some
3We  recognimze  that some conservation  professionals  would argue that the proper unit of measurement  is not
species, but ecosystems.  At an extreme, researchers who hold this view might question the entire foundation  of
a species-oriented  approach.  There are two reasons why we feel that the species-oonented  approach used in this
paper is justified.  First, the species concept has a long history as being the most defensible basic unit of
biology, or even ecology.  Conversely,  the ecosystem concept, while perhaps valuable in principle, simply does
not have a comparable status to the species as an operational  biological measure.  Second, a desire to use
ecosystems  as the basic unit does not obviate the need to perform an economic  analysis; actually, the same
underlying  issues about how to make conservation  choices under a limited budget must be faced in either case.5
exceptions,  most  endangered  species  have  little or no commercial  value, so this category  can
be effectively  ignored  as a significant  motivation  in government  spending. 4 Next, the
ecosystem  value  is not understood  well enough  to be useful for making  decisions  about
individual  species  and, therefore,  is not likely  to explain  any of the patterns  in our data. 5
Moral values  are always  very difficult  to quantify,  and we break no new  ground  here.
However,  we do feel that the results  shed  some  light  on what might  reasonably  be called
"moral  preferences",  and we reflect  upon this possibility  later.
B. "Relevant  and Measurable" Objectives  in Biodiversity  Preservation
As.  stated  previously,  there are many  components  which might  on principle  be
included  in society's  objective  function  for biodiversity,  but only a subset  are both relevant
and measurable  at this time. Below,  we describe  the three components  of this subset  that we
have  been  able to identify,  all of which fall  into the class of existence  values. Because  it is
not possible  to obtain  reliable  measures  of any component  for all species  of plants  and
animals,  we confine  our analysis  to cover only vertebrate  species,  which  in effect  constitute  a
single  phylum  of the animal  kingdom. The importance  and implications  of this restriction
are discussed  further in the following  sections.
1) People  often speak  of the large amount  of attention  paid to "charismatic
megafauna'. Just knowing  that elephants  and pandas  exist  in the wild has value  to some
people,  even  if they never actually  witness  the wild elephants  and pandas  first hand; this
effect  is likely to be less pronounced  for species  of wild toads  or eels.  Since  existence  value
of a species  may indeed  be a function  of its charisma  and physical  size, we would  ideally
like some  good measure  of both. We capture  the "megafauna"  part by using  the physical
4Some  fisheries fill  into the class of exceptions, with whale species perhaps the most obvious examples.
Since, as is explained  later, our analysis does not include marine species, the importance  of commercial  value in
our sample seems minimal.
51  :rejecting  inclusion of an 'ecological significance"  variable in the govermment's  priority system, Fay and
Thomas (1983), p.43101, state that 'is  kind of information  is seldom  available  at the time a species is
considered  for listing...'6
length  of an average  representative  of the species.' At this stage, we have not obtained  a
satisfactory  measure  of "charisma",  although  we have  received  many creative  suggestions. 7
2) Another  possible  component  of existence  value  is the degree  to which  a species  is
considered  to be a "higher  form of life".  In many  contexts,  it seems  obvious  that human
beings  care about other people  in proportion  to the degree  to which they can identify  with
them. We might  believe  that this feeling  extends  to "higher  forms of life" as well.  We are
not suggesting  that this is an ideal  ethical  criterion  to use; in fact, we are making  no
normative  judgement  at all.  Instead,  we want to recognize  that if people  do actually  make
distinctions  among  species  in this way, then it will necessarily  be a component  of existence
value.'  To test for the possible  role of such  a component,  we have  divided  the data set into
the five broad classes  of vertebrates:  mammal,  bird, reptile, amphibian  and fish. In the
regressions  of the following  sections,  we include  dummy  variables  for each of these classes
to see if current  policy  discriminates  among  them.
3) Since  we also may have existence  value  for "biodiversity"  as a whole, some
measure  of the amount  that a species  adds to this diversity  should  play a role in deciding  how
much to spend  on it.  As a measure  of such  added  diversity,  we might  use a species'
taxonomic  distinctiveness,  or difference,  from other species.9 Other things  equal, the  more
unique  a species  is, as measured  by distance  from its closest  living relative,  the more
'Lowe et.al. (1990) and Mosely (1992) give fairly  precise length ranges for all species on tie U.S.
endangered species lisL  For non-listed species, we consulted several standard biological references to obtain
length estimates. A complete listing of these sources is contaned in the bibliography. In some cases, we were
not able to obtain a published length for a species and it was necessary  to form an estimate  by using data from
closely related species.
'Among the suggestions  are: eye-size or eye-body  ratio, number of times the animal's name appears in
children's books or in articles in The New York Tumes,  space devoted to the animal in zoDs, and  subjective
charsma  ratings from an as yet unperformed psychology  expedment.  Our judgement at this time is that none of
these measures  would be usefil enough to justify their inclusion.
'It is also possible to interpret this type of existence  value as an example of a moral value, as in the
previous section.  Such a theme is developed in Nash (1989).  We commenut  on the implications  of this
interpretation later in the paper.  For now, however, we think of the 'higher form of life  effect as an
anthropocentric  value that can explicitly  be placed inside a cost-benefit  analysis.
9Tbis theme is developed more fully in Weitzman (1992) and (1993).7
attention  we should  pay to its preservation. As a measure  of taxonomic  uniqueness,  we use
dummy  variables  to discriminate  among  three possibilities.  First, a "Full Species' is our
term for a genuine  species  in the generally  accepted  biological  sense.' 0 Next, a "Monotypic
Genus"  is a full species  that constitutes  the sole  representative  of its genus." Finally, we
use the term "Subspecies"  to mean  any taxonomic  unit  below the level of a full species. Of
these three types, "Monotypic  Genus"  is the most  taxonomically  distinct,  while  "Subspecies"
is the least.
Finally, a fourth factor  to be considered  does not relat  directly  to species  value, but
rather to the probability  of preventing  extinction.
4) Any  preservation  decision  should  pay some  attention  to the actual  level  of
endangerment  of the species  in question. Other things  equal,  preservation  dollars should  go
to reccver the more  endangered  species.' 2 Our data  for endangerment  comes  from the
Nature Conservancy  (NC), which  trcks  an exhaustive  subset  of all vertebrate  'full species"
in the U.S. and provides "global  endangerment"  ranks  on a scale of I (most  endangered)  to 5
(least  endangered).  Overall,  the NC ranldng  system  is by far the most comprehensive  and
objective  measure  of species  endangerment  that we could find. Bach of the interval  rankdngs
'The  'genemrly  accepted" biological-species  definition  is typically  ascribed to Ermst  Mayr: "Species  ar
groups of actually or potentially  interbreeding  natural populations  reproductively isolated from other such
groups.
"The Genus is the taxonomic  level just above species.
121n  a fonnal model  of biodiversity  preservation, such as Weitzman  (1993), a more appropriate  statement  is
something like the following:  other things equal, we should spend more money on species with higher marinal
decreases in extinction  probability per dollar spent.  In practice, there probably is a high correlation  between  a
species' 'absolute  and 'marginal' levels of endangerment,  so the two concepts may actually  turn out to be
similar.  Throughout  this paper we finesse the possible distinction  between  marginal and absolute  lvev,  of
endangerment.8
of 1 through  5 has a well-defined  meaning, and a serious effort is made by the NC to apply
the rankings consistently. 13
These four factors make up the subset that we feel is both relevant  and measurable.
In order to adjust for the importance  of any relevant but uzneasurable factors, we later
define a "residual" component  of existence  value and attempt to estimate the effect of its
omission from the regressions.  This artificial construction  will be explained  in Section 4,
where it plays an important role in interpreting the pattern of spending  decisions.
3. The Listing Decision
A. Background: The Endangered Species Act of 1973
The Endangered  Species Act of 1973 ("the Act') created a framework  for the
preservation of endangered  plants and aiimals in the United States. This framework is
administered  primarily by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), an agency of
the Department  of the Interior, which oversees the recovery of all terrestrial and freshwater
species of plants and animals. 14 The term "species", although  having a fairly precise
technical meaning  to taxonomists, is defined in the Act to include subspecies,  varieties (for
plants), and populations  (for vertebrates), in addition  to 'true'  species  in the technical
"The Nature Conservancy  distinguishes  between  global ranks, called 'G-ranks', which are given to full
species,  and 'T-ranks", which are given to subspecies  or populations. In our data set, we use the raoltng
relevant to the taxonomic  unit being studied, i.e. G-ranks for full species  and T-ranks for subspecies.  The
definitions  of G-ranks given by the NC are: G1 - critically imperiled  throughout  their range and typically  have
fewer than 6 occurrences  in the world, or fewer than 1000  individuals;  62  - imperiled  throughout  their range
and typically  have between  6 and 20 occurrences,  or fewer than 3000 individuals;  G3 - vulnerable  throughout
their range and typically  have fewer than 100  occurrences,  or fewer than 10000  individuals;  G4 - apparendly
secure throughout  its range (but possibly rare in parts of its range); G5 - demonstrably  secure throughout  its
range (however,  it may be rare in certain areas).  See National  Heritage  Data Center (1992) and (1993a).
'Me  National  Marine Fisheries Service  is responsible  for the administration  of the Act for most marine
species. In this paper, we focus our attention  exclusively  on the species monitored  by the FWS.  We focus on
the FWS because  the National Marine Fishery Service  does not publish data comparable  to our FWS sources.
Since the vast majority  of recovery  programs  are managed  by the FWS, this restriction  does not play a role in
our results.9
biological  sense.' 5 Where  not otherwise  specified,  we follow  this biologically-imprecise
terminology  and use the word  'species"  to refer  to any taxonomic  unit  eligible  for protection
under  the Act
The process  of listing  a species  for protection  begins  when  the species  is proposed  by
FWS  as a "candidate".  During  its period  of candidacy,  FWS  gathers  data  from internal  and
external  scientific  sourcea  in order  to determine  whether  the species  warrants  listing  and
protection. The process  stalls  here for most  candidates;  out of over 3600  candidates  for
listing  in 1993,  there  is insufficient  scientific  data  to make  a decision  on about  3000.16  If
sufficient  scientific  data  exist  and the data  are judged  to warrant  listing,  then  FWS  can  place
a formal  proposal  in the Federal  Register. After  a public  comment  period, FWS  makes  a
final  decision. A species  may be listed  as "endangered"  or "threatened".  An  Uendangered"
species  is "in danger  of extinction  throughout  all or a significant  portion  of its range". A
"rtened  species  is "likely  to become  endangered  in the  foreseeable  future.'7 Both
tpes  are considered  to be 'listed' and, while  there are some  legal  distinctions,  in practice
they are given  the same  protection  under  the Act. For the  remainder  of the paper, we  ignore
the distinction  between  endangered  and reatened species  and we refer  to all listed  species  as
"endangered".
For good  reasons,  the decision  to list a species  is given  considerable  attention  by the
EWS. Once  protected,  endangered  species  can cause  large disruptions  and force  developers
to delay  or even  cancel  projects  that might  harm  the species. For expositional  purposes,  we
can effectively  divide  the stipulations  of the Endangered  Species  Act into 'protective'  and
'recovery' measures. 'Protective'  measures  are restrictions  on activities  which  harm  listed
species. These  restictions are more  stringent  for public,  especially  federal,  activities  than
for private  activities. On federal  land  or in projects  requiring  federal  permits,  species  are
5A vertebrate  'population"  is a taxonomic  group  below  the  subspecies  level. Our analysis  combines
subspecies  and populations  in the  sanne  category.
"This total  includes  invertbrates  and  plants  as well  as the  vertebrates  studied  in this  paper.
"iThe  background  and  definitions  are drawn  from  the  Endangered  Species  Act of 1973  and from  the FWS
publication,  Placing  Animals  and  Plants  on the  List  of Endangered  and  Threatened  Species",  U.S. Fish  and
Wildlife  Sevice (1993). This  publication  also  includes  a detailed  description  of the listing  process.10
protected  from any adverse  effect  of an activity,  including  habitat  alteration. The most
prominent  examples  of such  activities  are dam or other construction,  and mining  or logging
on federal  land.  On private  land,  it is primarily  forms  of direct  harm that are restricted.
Direct  harm is defined  specifically  in the Act and includes  such  obvious  examples  as
shooting,  trapping,  and selling. 'Recovery'  measures  give the government  the power  to
improve  the condition  of listed  species. The Act provides  FWS  with the authorization  to
develop  and implement  plans  to preserve  and improve  the condition  of listed  species. More
importantly,  the Act gives  FWS  and other federal  agencies  the authority  to purchase
significant  habitat  sites and to aid state  agencies  that have  agreements  with  FWS.
B. Regression  #1: Factors in the Listing  Decision
Since listing  a species  is the crucial  first step  in its protection,  it would  be helpful  to
gain a better understanding  of the determinants  of the government's  decision. What  role, if
any, is played  by the "relevant  and measurable"  objectives  discussed  in tfie  previous  section?
To answer this question, we constructed a sample of all vertebrate "full  species" which might
possibly  be considered  for listing.  This sample  excludes  all taxonomic  units below  the "full
species"  level; that is, we do not include  any subspecies  or populations. Such  a sample  is
possible  because  the Nature  Conservancy  database  contains  an exhaustive  list of aU  U.S.
vertebr-ate  (full)  species." 5 We  restrict  our sample  to all full species,  listed  and unlisted,
that meet a minimum  threshold  of endangerment  - the NC endangerment  rank of 3 or lower.
This leaves  us with a sample  of 511 full species,  of which  almost  half are fish.  Using  this
sample,  we esfimate  a logit  regression  with a dependent  dummy  variable,  LISTED,  which  is
set to 1 if  the  (fll) species was listed  as of March 1993  and to O  otherwise. The
independent  variables are Nature Conservancy  degree of endangerment  rank (NCRANIQ,  log
of physical  length  (LNLENGTH),  dummies  for the taxonomic  class (MAMMAL,  BIRD,
REPTILE,  and AMPHIBIAN  - fish is the benchmark),  and a dummy  for monotypic  genus
(MONOTYPIC).
"We  exclude  subspecies  from  this  analysis  because  the  NC  does  not  track  a complete  list of U.S.
sibspecies We do  not  even  know  how  many  non-listed  subspecies  exist,  much  less  what  they  arm.II
REGRESSION #1 - THE LISTING DECISION
LISTED  I  Coef.  Std. Err.  t  P> Iti
MAMMAL  1  1.11  .42  2.679  0.008
BIRD  1  1.21  .38  3.224  0.001
REPTILE  1  .92  .44  2.102  0.036
AMPHIBIAN  -1.51  .45  -3.339  0.001
NCRANK  1  -1.47  .16  -9.238  0.000
LNLENGTH  .25  .14  1.713  0.087
MONOTYPIC  j  .84  .39  2.177  0.030
CONSTANT  j  1.07  .42  2.550  0.011
Dependent  variable  is LISTED. Method  of estimation  is logit. 511 observations.
These  results  indicate  that many  forces  play a role  in the listing  process.
1) The coefficient  on LNLENGTH  is positive  and significant  at the 10  percent  level;
other  thffings  equal,  a 1 percent  increase  in physical  length  translates  into  approximately  a .05
percentage  point  increase  in the likelihood  of listing. 1'
2) Similar  translations  yield statistically  significant  estimates  for mammals,  birds,
reptiles  and amphibians  (relative  to fish)  of 20, 22, 17 and -27  percentage  points,
respectively.  All of these  results  are significant  at the five  percent  level?
"As a first approximation,  logit coefficients  can be transated into probability  terms by multiplying  by p(1-
p), where p is the mean of the dependent  variable. In this case, p  = .24 and p(l-p)  w  .18.
'Readers may notice that the order of listing  preference suggested  by this regression  places fish ahead of
amphibians,  while an evolutionary  tree would place humans closer to amphibians  than io fEh  We are not swe
that an evolutionary  tree is the correct measwe of what constitutes  a 'higher form of life", and the main reason
we ran the regression with dummies rather than a single ordered -evolutionary-  variable was to remain  agnostic
on this issue.  Nevertheless,  the overall  pattern of the coefficient  estimates  is consistent  with a loose
evolutionary  interpretation  of "higher" as being "more closely  rlated  to humans".12
3) Monotypic  genera  show  a statistically  significant  increased  listing  likelihood  of 15
percentage  points 21
4) NCRANK  has the expected  influence  on listing. The negative  coefficient  implies
that a low NCRANK  - which implies high endangerment  - results in a higher likelihood of
listing. A translation  of the coefficient  into  probability  terms  implies  that a one unit increase
in NCRANK  results  in an approximate  26 percentage  point  rise in the likelihood  of listing.
Most  of these  coefficient  values  are not surprising. As mentioned  in Section  2, a
species  becomes  listed  only  after there  is significant  scientific  evidence  on its endangerment.
Thus,  we would  expect  that well-studied  species  would  have  a greater  chance  of meeting  the
necessary  scientific  standard  and passing  from being  a candidate  for listing  to becoming
listed. Since  humans  allocate  their scarce  scholarly  resources  for many  of the same  reasons
cited for preservation,  our results  may  indicate  which  species  we like to study  as much  as
they indicate  which  species  we want  to preserve. This complication  is unavoidable.
Nevertheless,  the results  of this regression  certainly  show  that species  are listed  for more
an just 'scientific'  characteristics  such  as uniqueness  and endangerment;  'visceral'
components  of existence  value, like size  and the degree  to which  a species  is considered  a
"higher  form of life", seem  to affect  the listing  decision  as well.
4. The Spending  Decision
A. Background:  Spending  Data and the 1988  Amendment
Once  a species  has been  listed  under  the Act, FWS  is charged  with  the creation  of a
2 "Although we  re only able to study the MONOTYPIC  dummy  in this regression,  we woud ideaUly  like to
know if subspeies are treated differently from full species  in the listing  process.  Since an exhaustive  list of all
verebrate subspecies  does not exist, it is impossible  to answer this question formally. We can, however, make
an educated  guess by using some simple ratios. Tear et.al. (1993) estimate  that the ratio of subspecies  to full
species in North America  is 6.9:1 for mammals  and 4.9:1 for birds; in the sample of listed species, the ratio of
subspeies to full species  is 2.4:1 for mammals  and 1.1:1 for birds.  Although  these ratios consider only one
fiator and cannot be calculated  for all vertebmate  classes, the disparity  at least  suggests  that fill  species are
given preference to subspecies  at the listing  stage.13
"recovery  plan", which sets out the steps to be taken  to improve  the condition  of the species.
Internal  audits  by the U.S. Department  of the Interior  estimate  that the potential  direct  costs
implied  by the recovery  plans  of all listed  species  are about  $4.6 billion.? Since  the total
available  budget  falls far short of this figure,  all agencies  with spending  programs  must make
choices  among  projects.? During the 1980's,  some members  of Congress  seemingly
becaxne  concerned  that a disproportionate  share  of these  limited  conservation  dollars  were
being used to preserve  a small  number  of species. Apparently,  there was sufficient  interest
in this issue to pass an Amendment  to the Act in 1988  requiring  FWS to prepare  annual
reports on the amount  of federal  and state spending  broken  down by species. The date.
collected  by EWS  was first published  for fiscal  year 1989,  and has subsequently  been
published  for FY 1990  and FY 19913' Spending  from these three years is the nwain  object
of study  in this section. In the following  paragraphs,  we explain  the nature  of this data, how
it was collected,  and what types  of spending  are and are not included.
The 1988  Amendment  specifically  charged  EWS  with maldng  a "good  faith"  effort to
calculate  all expenditures  that were "reasonably  identifiable"  to an individual  spcies.  If
spending  cannot  be broken  down by species,  then it is not included  in the final total.
Although  the definition reasonably  identifiable"  may seem  somewhat  imprecise,  in practice
it seems  to cover fairly  broad  classes  of expenditures  that are more or less operationally
defined. Examples  of expenditures  usually  included  are habitat  acquisitions  designed
primarily  for a single  species,  captive  breeding  programs,  operating  expenses  of wildlife
preserves  mostly  dedicated  to a single  species,  population  censuses,  and scientific  study.
Examples  of expenditures  that are typically  not identifiable  to a single  species  are salaries  of
=U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (1990b), p.7.
"Calculating  the total budget available for recovery projects is not straightforward. There are several
sources of disretionary  finds that can be used for many  purposes in any year, with biodiversity  preservation
only one possibility. Any way that it is calculated, however, the budget is much less than $4.6 billion.
2 3 he relevant sources are U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (1990a), (1991) and (1992a). We plan to update
this dataset to include FY 1992 spending  when FWS releases this information,  but we do not anticipate  major
changes in our results.14
FWS personnel, operating expenses of general wildlife preserves, multi-species  habitat
purchases and the opportunity  costs of legal restrictions  on development.
Since the published expenditure  figures exclude some public as well as all private
expenditures, they do not completely  account for the overall cost of wildlife preservation.
As a result of this incomplete  data, and for other reasons, we do not envision ourselves here
as doing any kind of formal, comprehensive,  society-wide  cost-effectiveness  analysis of
current policies.  Basically,  we think of the reported spending figures as a noisy reflection of
some underlying measure of concem for the various species.  In studying  reported species-
by-species  spending, we seek only the modest goal of finding  patterns in the data which may
reflect underlying preferences of the relevant decision-maling  organizations.
As for mechanics  of the spending decision, the first thing to note is that the aggregate
government spending figures we use come from many different agencies, at both the federal
and state levels.  Some of the spending is on items specifically  mandated  in the budget of a
relevant agency.  In essence, the legislative  branch controls this mandated  expenditure
directly.  Another part of spending is discretionary and comes from funds managed by FWS
or appropriated by FWS from other government sources.  To guide these discretionary
spending decisions, FWS has developed  a system for prioritizing species; we discuss this
prioritization system in Section 5.  In our opinion, it would be an oversimplification  to
ascribe some fraction of spending to Congress and the remainder to other relevant agencies,
because many of the decisions  are made with input from both sides.  Therefore, we treat all
of the spending as if it comes from "the government' in general, although this clearly leaves
many subtle political factors beyond the scope of our analysis.
The spending figures published  in the annual expenditure  report are collected from
three sources.  First, FWS calculates its own spending. Second, expenditures  by the states
are reported to a centrl  conservation  organization, which then passes the totals along to
FWS.  Third, each federal agency reports its expenditures  individually  to FWS.  Since its
inception  in the 1989 fiscal year, the process has become more efficient and agencies have
become more adept at identifying  conservation  expenditures  from within their budgets.  (In
the early years, for example, the state numbers are somewhat  incomplete.) Some of the
remarkable growth in total reported expenditures, which have risen from $43 million in 198915
to $102  million  in 1990  to $177 million  in 1991,  is attributable  to this improvement  in data
gathering. The bulk  of the spending  is done  by the federal  government,  with FWS  itself
comprising  about  half of the federal  total. For all three  years, the federal  total  of
conservation  expenditures  is $248 million,  while  the state  total is $74 million. Expenditure
data is collected  on all listed  plant  and animal  species. However,  as already  noted,  we
confine  our attention  to the vertebrates. Since  approximately  95 percent  of the identifiable
conservation  budget  is spent  on vertebrates,  we are confidant  that  any patterns  uncovered
here would  be robust  in the complete  sample  of listed  species.
B. Regression  *72:  Determinants  of Spending
Regression  #2 uses the log of total spending  from 1989  to 1991  (LNTOTAL)  as the
dependent  variable. Since  we only observe  spending  on a species  when  it is greater  than
$100,  the dependent  variable  is censored  at ln(100)  and the appropriate  estimating  procedure
is a Tobit  regression.?5  The independent  variables  are the same  as those  in Regression  #1,
with the addition  of a SUBSPECIES  dummy  for listed  taxonomic  units  below  the full species
level.
Before  discussing  the regression  results,  it is helpful  for the exposition  to introduce  a
hypothetical  variable  which  we call  CHARISMA".  We think  of this variable  as the
unmeasurable  part of existence  value, and we mechanically  define it to be orthogonal to all
of the independent  variables  used  in Regression  #1.i  Although  it may seem  to be an
unorthodox  construction,  CHARISMA  is  just a statistically  harmless  fiction  that enables  us to
discuss  a possible  bias  in our estimates.  In writing  about  this hypothetical  variable  as if it
actually  exists  in the real world,  we seek  only  to simplify  the exposition. For this purpose,
we treat CHARISMA  as a 'real' variable  omitted  from  the right-hand-side  of Regressions  #1
25Because  there are only two  sored  observations,  the results of the Tobit esfimation  are practically
identical  to those of an OLS  regression  using the same  variables.
26We  can do a thought  expeiment to envision  what the CHARISMA  variable reprsents.  First, imagine that
we could create a perfect measure  for the existence  value of each species. Next, regress this perfect measure
on the set of independent  variables  used in Regression  #1.  Define the residuals from this regression  to be the
CHARISMA  variable.16
and #2, and we assume that its coefficient  would have been positive in both regressions. We
then discuss how the estimated coefficients  on the other regressors would be biased by this
omission.
bI Regression  #1, we could think of the sample as being randomly selected from the
population  of all vertebrate full species.  By construction,  CHARISMA  is uncorrelated  in this
population  with the right-hand side variables: LNLENCTH, NCRANK, MONOTYPIC,  and
the taxonomic  class dummies.  Hence, in principle, there is no omitted variable bias
introduced  in Regression #1.  The sample used in Regression  #2, however, consists only of
listed species, and thus is specially selected  by the listing process.  If CHARISMA  has a
positive influence  on listing likelihood, then within this sample it may well be correlated with
other variables found to affect the listing decision. For example, since the estimated
coefficient  on LNLENGTH is positive in Regression  #1, then, other things equal, a species
with high CHARISMA  would require lower LNLENGTH to achieve the same listing
likelihood. Therefore, in a sample of only listed species, CHARISMA  and LNLENGTH are
likely to be inversely correlated.  Analogous  reasoning  can be used on each of the other
regressors - in general, each variable's correlation with CHARISMA  will be opposite to the
sign of its respectve coefficient  in Regression  #1.  Thus, if we make the natumal  assumption
that CHARISMA  also has a positive influence  on the spending  decision, then the direction of
the omitted variable bias on each coefficient  in Regression  #2 will also be opposite to the
sign of the respective  coefficient  in Regression  #1.  This bias is discussed  below on a case-
by-case basis.17
REGRESSION #2 - THE SPENDING DECISION
LNTOTAL  I  Coe.  Std. Err.  t  P> ItI
MAMMAL  I  .75  .44  1.717  0.087
BIRD  I  .27  .37  0.721  0.472
REPTILE  1  -1.72  .50  -3.443  0.000
AMPHIBIAN  j  -.94  .66  -1.422  0.156
NCRANK  1  .65  .19  3.423  0.000
LNLENGTH  }  1.03  .15  6.747  0.000
MONOTYPIC  I  -.37  .50  -0.736  0.462
SUBSPECIES  j  -.35  .30  -1.177  0.240
CONSTANT  I  7.69  .45  16.959  0.000
Dependent variable is LNTOTAL.  Method of estimation is Tobit. 237 observations.
The results of Regression #2 suggest several patterns in spending behavior.?
1) The coefficient on LNLENGTH is highly significant, statistically and
quantitatively. This coefficient may be interpreted here in a normal fashion as an elasticity;
it implies an approximate 1 percent increase in spending for a 1 percent increase in length.
Since our analysis suggests that LNLENGTH and CHARISMA are negatively correlated in
the sample of listed species, the omission of CHARISMA  from Regression #2 should bias the
coefficient on LNLENGTH downward.  This further strengthens our finding of a highly
significant positive effect.'
2) The taxonomic class dummies, as a group, seem to have a significant  effect on
spending.  Since the fish dummy is left out, all of the other taxonomic class coefficients
I'he  pattems discussed below are not driven by a small subset of the sample. For example, if we exclude
the ten species with the highest spending,  which together comprise more than half of all spending, then the same
qualitative results are found.
nTo support a reproductively  viable population, physically large species typically  require more habitat than
do physically small species.  Hence, it is conceivable  that the significant positive coefficient  on LNLENGTH  is
capturing different species'  needs".  We think the explanatory  power of this argument is smalL  Nevertheless,
as with all other plausible explanations, we would gladly return to this question if relevant data on species'
'needs'  become available.18
measure  spending  on that class relative  to fish.  The results show  that the MAMMAL
dummy  enters  positively  and the REPTILE  dummy  enters  negatively. The coefficients  on
BIRD  and AMPHIBIAN  are of the expected  sign, but the magnitudes  are not significandy
different  from zero.  The oveall pattern  to the coefficients  is fairly  consistent  with the one-
time  official  policy of FWS to give spending  preference  to the "higher"  animals  in the
following order: mammal - bird - fish - reptile - amphibian.  This policy was officially
abandoned  in 1983,  when  Congress  explicitly  directed  the FWS to implement  a priority
system  that ignored  the distinction  between  "higher"  and 'lower" life forms. However,  as
the regression  results suggest,  such a policy may actually  reflect underlying  preferences.'
The effect of omitted  variable  bias would  mostly support  this interpretation. Since
MAMMAL  and BIRD  are probably  negatively  correlated  with CHARISMA  in this sample,
their estimated  coefficients  should  be biased  downward. Conversely,  the coefficient  on
A  HMPHIIAN  should be biased upward.  Adjusting for this bias would tend to reinforce the
pattern  already  found.  Only  for the coefficient  on REPTILE  would the omitted  variable  bias
possibly  change  the coefficient  sign, since it is likely to be biased  downward  in this estimate.
3) Since the "Full Species"  dummy  is left out, the other two taxonomy  dumnmies
measure spending relative to this class.  Our qualitative prediction from the discussion in
Section  2 is that taxonomic  uniqueness  should  have  a positive  influence  on spending,  so that
we should  find a positive  coefficient  on MONOTYPIC  and a negative  coefficient  on
SUBSPECIES.  Actually,  we find estimated  coefficients  on both to be negative  but
statistically  insignificant. Adjusting  for bias due to the omission  of CHARISMA  yields
inconclusive  results. It is likely  that the MONOTYPIC  coefficient  is biased  downward  and
the SUBSPECIES  coefficient  is biased  upward. This bias could conceivably  be sufficient  to
mask  a small  role for taxonomic  uniqueness.
4)  A surprising  and counterintuitive  result is the highly  statistically  significant
positive  coefficient  on NCRANK. At face  value, this means  that a decreased  level of
'rhere  is an issue  here, and throughout  the  paper,  about  taking  the spending  on species  at face  value. For
example,  spending  on fish living  in rivers might  be a proxy  for our desire  to preserve  rivers, and have  little to
do with a desire  to preserve  fish  per se. This kind  of problem  occurs often  in empirical  work  and, at some
level, it is impossible  to elimina completely.  We have  no reason  to believe  that the problem  is particularly
acute in this case.19
endangerinent  -- thus, a higher  NCRANK  -- implies  more spending.  The appropriate
interpretation  of this result depends  on the size of the bias from the omission  of
CHARISMA. Suppose,  at one extreme,  that the omitted  variable  bias is small  or negligible.
Then, we would conclude  that NCRANK  actually  plays a perverse  role in spending
decisions.  We consider  it to be an implausible  conclusion  that, controlling  for all other
obsenrable  factors, a more truly endangered  species  actually  gets less money  spent on it;
nevertheless,  such  an interpretation  cannot  be excluded  by our results. At the other extreme,
suppose  that the omitted  variable  bias is large.  Under this scenario,  the 'true' NCRANK
coefficient  could be negative,  but the omitted  variable  bias would  be large enough to tm  a
significant  negative  coefficient  into a significant  positive  coefficient If this is indeed  the
explanation  for the positive  coefficient  on NCRANK,  then it is a powerful  illustration  of the
role CHARISMA  is playing  in the spending  decision. In this case, we would conclude  that
any influence  of NCRANK  in its "expected"  direction  is more than outweighed  by the mle of
CHARISMA. We believe  that this conclusion  is probably  correct  Since NCRANK  plays a
very significant  role in the listing  process,  it is likely that CHARISMA  and NCRANK  are
higbly  corelted  in the population  of listed species  and that the omission  of CHARISMA
from Regression  #2 severely  biases he NCRANK  coeffcient upwards.  There is also
considerable  casual  evidence  to support  this conclusion. Species  with the highest  spending
include many 'charismatic' species  with very low endangennent  - the Bald  Eagle, Florida
Scrub  Jay and Grizzly  Bear  among the most promniinent  exaamples.  Adjustments  for other
characristics  fail to explain  why these species  receive  high spending,  as each also has large
positive  residuals  in Regession #2.
It seems fair to conclude  that spending  choices  are determined  much more by
'visceral' than by 'scientific'  characteristics;  LNLENGTH  and taxonomic  class play
significant  roles, while the effect of taxononic uniqueness  and NCRANK  are, at best,
overshadowed  by bias due to the omission  of CHARISMA.  Indeed,  the results are even
more striking  when we realize  that the inclusion  of taxonomic  class  dummies  essentially
resticts LNLENGTH  to the role of explaining  'within' class variation  of spending;  absent
taxonoric class dummies  on the right-hand-side,  the coefficient  on LNLENGTH  would  be20
even  greater, as length  explains  some  of the "between"  class variation  as well.  Overall,  the
one-line  message  to take away from our study  of spending  behavior  is "size matters  a lot".
Again, we should  note that this is not necessarily  'wrong', since "size' might  justifiably  be
included  in a society's  objective  function. However,  it should  also be noted that such heavy
weighting  of 'visceral' elements  seemingly  goes against  the language  and spirit  of current
FWS policy, which strongly  stresses  'scientific'  characteristics. For example,  the FWS
numerical  priority system  is based entirely  on 'scientific'  elements. In the next section, we
study  this priority  system  in more detail, and test for its relative  importance  in the spending
decision.
5. The FWS Priority  System
A. Background and Discussion
In 1983,  EWS  created  a formal "priority  system"  to serve as a guide in their listing
and spending  decisions?" In this section, we describe  the official  system  adopted  for
spending  decisions  and we discuss  several  aspects  that can yield insights  into underlying
preferences  towards  conservation. Then, we test for the priority systems's  role in explaining
the observed  pattern of spending. Overall,  the system  is intended  to be used as a guide
rather dtan a strict set of rules; nevertheless,  if the government  were using  the system  as it
was designed,  we would expect  the data to show  some-evidence  of successful
implementation.
To study  this issue, Regression  #3 includes  a regressor  called  PRIORITY,  a variable
which is equal to FWS's published  pnonty rank.  PRIORrIY ranges  from 1 (FWS's highest
rank) to 18 (FWS's lowest  rank). There are three components  of this number. In strictly
decreasing  lexicographic  order of importance,  these components  are "degree  of threat  (3
grades), "recovery potential" (2 grades), and "taxonomy" (3 grades), maling  a total of 18
combinations. "Degree  of threat" is a similar  concept  to NCRANK,  as both attempt  to
measure  the absolute  endangerment  level of the species. Also, each is on a three-point  scale
3Wie official FWS description  ad  defense of their priority system is contained in Fay and Thomas (1983).21
in our sample. Despite  this conceptual  similarity,  the two measures  are not highly  correlated
- an issue we return to later.  "Recovery  potential"  is a measure  of the ease or difficulty  of
improving  a species' condition. Species  with a "high"  recovery  potential  are perceived  to
have  well-understood  threats  which  do not require  intensive  management  to be alleviated.
The three "taxonomy"  grades  are the same as we used in Regression  #2: monotypic  genus,
full species, and subspecies. In addition,  the priority system  recognizes  species  seen to be in
"conflict  with construction  or other development  pmjects  or other fonns of economic
rtvity.u  Species  in "conflict"  do not receive  a higher  priority number  than those  not in
conflict, but they are given a tie-brealing  preference  between  species  with the same (#1-18)
rankdng. We include  a dummy  variable, CONFLICT  (1 if species  is in conflict,  0 if not), to
recognize  this additional  distinction.
It is not part of our purpose  here to have a complete  discussion  about the merits  and
faults  of the priority system  described  above. Nevertheless,  there are several  observations
about  this system  which may yield insight  into the atfitudes  and preferences  of its creators.
First, it is notable  that a lexicographic  ordering  is used in creating  the ranldng. This
ordering  means, for example,  that any species  with  the highest  grade of 'degree of threat'
will always  be assigned  a higher  priority than any other species  with the middle  grade of
"degree  of tht,  even if the latter species has higher grades of "recovery  potential' and
"taxonomy". Such a method  effectively  precludes  any possibility  of trade-offs  among  the
three criteria. This rigidity suggests  a very extreme  objective  function. Second,  the
inclusion  of "recovery  potential"  could be viewed  as an attempt  to quantify  the cost-
effectiveness of recovery.  But, by placing "degree  of tireat'  prior to "recovery potential"
in the ordering, FWS is essentially  maldng  the statement  that "cost issues  are dominated  by
endangerment  issues'.  Our final  observation  concerns  the use of "conflict"  as a positive  tie-
breaker for species  priority.  It seems more reasonable  to suppose  that, other things  equal, it
is more cost-effective  to spend  money  on species  that are not in conflict  with development,
since  species  in conflict  are already imposing  opportunity  costs on society. The stated
3 "Fay  and Thomas (1983),  p.43104.22
preference  for preserving  species  in "conflictu  may reflect some  underlying  desire to pay
attention to high-profile species.
B. Regression  #3: The FWS Priority System
Regression  #3 is identical  to Regression  #2 except  for the addition  of PRIORrIY and
CONFLICr and the subtraction  of MONOTYPIC  and SUBSPECIES  from the list of
regressors. MONOTYPIC  and SUBSPECIES  are dropped  for statistical  reasons  because
they are included  as components  of PRIORrrY.
REGRESSION  #3 -THE SPENDING  DECISION  WITH FWS  PRIORrES
INTOTAL  I  Coef.  Std. Err.  t  P>  ItI
MiAMMAL  1  .54  .40  1.354  0.177
BIRD  1  .46  .34  1.342  0.181
REPTILE  I  -1.62  .47  -3.470  0.000
AMHIBAN  1  -1.19  .62  -1.917  0.057
NCRANK  I  .80  .18  4.398  0.000
LNLENG  1  .85  .14  5.944  0.000
PRIORITY  -.10  .04  -2.716  0.007
CONFLICT  1  1.20  .29  4.177  0.000
CONSTANT  1  7.99  .47  17.126  0.000
Dependent  variable  is LNTOTAL. Method  of estimation  is Tobit. 237 observations.
The coefficient  on PRIORrrY is negative  and statistically  significant. Other things
equal, high  priority species,  i.e. those  with a low numerical  PRIORITY,  receive  more
spending  than do low priority species. At first glance, this suggests  successful
implementation  of the priority system. Such  a conclusion  is mitigated,  however,  by the size
of the estimated  coefficient  on CONFLICT  Recall  that CONFLICT  is intended  to be the
least important  component  of the priority system,  as it acts only to break ties between  species
with the same  priority  number. In spite  of this ostensibly  small  role, the estimated
coefficient  on CONFLICT  is more than ten times  the estimated  doefficient  on PRIORrTY,
and its t-statisic is greater  an 4.  Since  ten units of PRIORITY-moving up from 14 to 423
result seems difficult to explain within the framework  of the FWS system.32  It is possible,
however, that the CONFLICT  variable is capturing  other influences  which are playing a
major role in the spending decision. Specifically,  species  in conflict  may generate extra
political attention. Then, through a variety of mechanisms,  such political  attention  might
translate into increased  spending.
There are also indications  that species in conflict  receive higher priority numbers than
they objectively  deserve.  As mentioned  earlier, the NC endangerment  rank (NCRANK)  and
FWS's "degree of threat" component  of PRIORITY  attempt to measure the same thing.
Nevertheless,  the correlation between the two measures  is far from perfect, and some of the
deviation  can be explained  by the existence  of conflict. To iliustate this point, we estimate
an OLS regression  of the FWS degree of threat (DEGREE)  on independent  variables
NCRANK  and CONFCT.33
REGRESSION  #4 - DETERMINATION  OF DEGREE OF THREAT
DEREE  |  Coef.  Std. Er.  t  P> ItI
NCRANK  I  .20  .05  4.333  0.000
CONFLICT  -.41  .07  -5.637  0.000
CONSTANT  I  1.28  .47  15.394  0.000
2
Adjusted R2 =  .17
Dependent variable is DEGREE. Method of estimation is OLS. 237 observations.
The coefficient  on NCRANK  is positive  and significant,  but considering  that a
coefficient  of 1 would indicate a perfect correlation, the size of the coefficient  seems low.
32Mann  and Plummer  (1993) were the first to indicate  the importance  of te  CONFLICT  variable. Their
results motivated  us to include  CONFLICr in our analysis.
33An  OLS regression  implies that we take the actual numencal  DEGREE ranings seriously. If we believe
that DEGREE ranldngs  are only ordered casses, then the proper  estimation  procedure  would  be ordered logit
Since, in this case, the results of an ordered  logit estimation  are very similr to OLS,  we only report the latter.
In either case, the indicated  choices  of idependent and dependent  varibles  aue  natural  beCaUSe  DEGREE is a
somewhat  subjective  measure  created  by the FWS, wbile NCRANK  and CONFLICT  are more objectively
detrmned.  No specific  standards  have been published  by the FWS  to explain  why species  receive  different
DEGREE  ranks.  NCRANK,  by contrast,  has fairly specific  guidelines  summaized in Nadonal Heritage Data
Center (1992). Also, CONFLICT  is the most objective  of the FWS ranks; the published  guidelines  state that
'Any species identified  ... as having  generad  a negative  biological  opinion  which concluded  that a given
proposed  project would  violate Section  7(a)(2)  of the Endangered  Species  Act or resulted  in the  e
of reasonable and prudent alernatives  to avoid a negative biological opinion would be assigned to the conflict
category  ... ".  Fay and Thomas  (1983).24
The coefficient on CONFLICT is negative and significant; this implies that species in conflict
are considered to be more endangered by the FWS than they are by the NC.  Since the
NCRANK measure is designed to take into account any conflict that threatens the global
survival of a species, the results of Regression #4 suggest that FWS may be inappropriately
factoring individual fmdings of local conflict into its supposedly objective endangerment
ratings.  Thus, not only does CONFLICT have a disproportionate influence on the spending
decision, but it may also subtly influence the rest of the priority system as well.'
6.  Conclusions
How do we spend our limited resources on preserving biodiversity?  In the
introduction, we proposed to analyze this issue from three directions: what should we be
doing, what do we say we are doing, and what are we doing?
The normative evaluation of endangered species policy is problematic, because it is
difficult to give a clear answer to 'what  should we be doing".  h  the paper, we discussed
the basic reason: lack of a common currency to serve as an "anchor'.  Since it has not been
possible to fame  preservation policy around a unifying concept, it should come as no
surprise that the actual policy choices do not conform to any specific criterion.  Until
progress is made on this methodological  problem, it will be very difficult to provide any
evaluation of whether we are preserving biodiversity efficiently.  Indeed, the simple insight
that 'no  usable anchor has been provided for evaluation" goes a long way towards explaining
the core dilemma of endangered species protection.  Furthermore, it is our sense that such
inherently fuzzy objectives are found in a growing number of policy areas, and thus the
central methodological problem encountered here is increasing in importance.
To better understand 'what we say we are doing", we looked at the government's
current system for setting spending priorities.  The analysis fnds  that, while the pnority
system is being implemented to some degree, the least important component of the system
"it  is also possible to explain the results of Regressions #4 by positing that CONFLICT contamins  some
superior information on the part of FWS.  Because NCRANK is continually updated while DEGREE is not, we
feel that this explanation is unlikely to be correct.25
had an infLuence  which far exceeded its prescribed role.  This component, a fairly 'objective'
measure of whether a species is in "conflict" with development, is also found to influence the
priority systemn  itself.  Such influence suggests that it might be useful to have a more formal
separation between an agency making policy and an agency gathering the scientific
information  necessary for the setting of priorities.  Without such a separation, even a well-
intentioned  government is prone to mixing these two distinct activities.
We analyzed "what are we doing" by examining the actual listing and spending
decisions of the relevant government agencies.  The overall pattem to these results is clearn
visceral characteristics of species, such as their physical size and the degree to which they
are considered to be "higher forms of life", explain a large part of both listing and spending
decisions.  More scientific characteristics, such as endangerment or uniqueness, play a role at
the listing stage but are overpowered by strong visceral elements at the spending stage.  The
evidence indicates that we pay more attention to species in the degree to which they are
perceived to resemble us in size or characteristics. A provocative interprtation  is to
s=mmarize current preservation policy as an expansion of rights and obligations towards
species that remind us of ourselves.  As such, this would represent continuation of a trend
that minrors an analogous broadening of the coverage of human rights in recent history.
Although ft remains highly speculative, this  'moral" int  on  of our results may indeed
be the best single explanation.26
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